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COMMENTS
STANDING TO CONTEST FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS:
THE SUPREME COURT'S NEW REQUIREMENTS
by Lawrence D. Stuart, Jr.
Federal aid to education programs which provide assistance to religious
as well as public schools arguably violate the establishment clause of the
first amendment.' Unfortunately, the early Supreme Court case of Frothingham v. Mellon,' which held that federal taxpayers have no standing to
contest federal appropriations, made it impossible for the validity of this
charge to be determined by a court. Recently, however, the Supreme Court
partially overturned the Frothingham doctrine, holding in Flast v. Cohen"
that federal taxpayers have standing to question federal appropriations
which allegedly violate the establishment clause. Moreover, the Court did
not specifically restrict the types of appropriations which a federal taxpayer may challenge to those which transgress the establishment clause.
Hence, the Flast decision not only is likely to presage litigation concerning
the constitutionality of federal aid to education, but also may lead to constitutional challenges to other federal taxing and spending programs, particularly the tax-exempt status of religious organizations. This Comment
discusses the basis of standing to contest government appropriations, the
trend of the courts in dealing with this problem, and the implications of
the Flast decision.
I.

CONCEPTUAL DIFFICULTIES OF STANDING To CONTEST
GOVERNMENT APPROPRIATIONS

Although "standing to sue" encompasses a complicated mixture of federal and state constitutional and statutory requirements and court-made
rules," in both state and federal courts the traditional doctrine has been that

the plaintiff has no standing unless he is injured or adversely affected by
the legislation which he attacks! In attempting to elucidate this principle,
'U.S. CoNST. amend. I. See, e.g., L. PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE AND FREEDOM (2d ed. 1967);
Davis, "Judicial Control of Administrative Action": A Review, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 635 (1966).
2262 U.S. 447 (1923).

3392 U.S. 83 (1968).
"E.g., United States ex rel.Chapman v. FPC, 345 U.S. 153 (1953) ; Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951); Alabama State Fed'n of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U.S.
450 (1945).
'E.g., Horne v. Federal Reserve Bank, 344 F.2d 725 (8th Cir. 1965); United States v. Lauer,
287 F.2d 633 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 818 (1961); Ex parte Cregler, 56 Cal. 2d 308,
363 P.2d 305, 14 Cal. Rptr. 289 (1961); State v. Donahue, 141 Conn. 656, 109 A.2d 364, cert.
denied, 349 U.S. 926 (1954); Huckaba v. Cox, 14 II. 2d 126, 150 N.E.2d 832 (1958).
It has been saidthat the functions of standing requirements are twofold-l) to implement
the separation of powers doctrine (see, e.g., Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S.
123, 151 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring): "Regard for separation of powers . . . restricts
the courts of the United States to issues presented in an adversary manner."; United Pub. Workers
v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947)), and (2) to insure that courts review only adversary proceedings, in which the issues to be adjudicated are most clearly defined (see, e.g., Arnold, Trial by
Combat and the New Deal, 47 HARV. L. REV. 913, 922 (1934): "These assumptions are reconciled with practical efficiency by the notion that the courts are more apt to formulate or apply
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one court observed that a plaintiff, to have standing, must suffer an injury
to a "private substantive legally protected interest . . . either of a 'recognized' character at 'common law,' or . .. created by statute."' This definition illustrates the two aspects of the standing concept. First, the plaintiff
must be "substantially" injured or affected. If he is not, standing will be
denied because of the legal maxim de minimis non curat lex.' Secondly, the
injury must be "personal" to the plaintiff. Thus, a plaintiff generally has
no standing to assert the rights of another,' or to contest a portion of a
statute which does not affect him even though he is affected by another
part of the statute." In addition, if the plaintiff's injury or interest is not
distinguishable from that suffered by "people generally," any "personal"
right which he may have is extinguished."
Because of the traditional standing precepts, a plaintiff has difficulty
establishing his standing to question government appropriations. Admittedly, an illegal or unconstitutional appropriation would seem to injure or
adversely affect all persons subject to the dominion of a government. But
in order to have standing, the plaintiff must demonstrate that his interest
in, or the injury caused to him by, the particular appropriation in question
is "personal," that is, different from that of everyone else. In the ordinary
case, where the appropriation is from general government funds, this cannot be done." Moreover, even if the plaintiff could establish a "personal"
injury, his standing to sue would be questionable. Although the collective
harm caused by illegal or unconstitutional government spending may be
great, the harm to any one person is likely to be slight and easily classified
rules soundly if the opposite sides are prevented from sitting around a table in a friendly conference. . . . Bitter partizanship in opposite directions is supposed to bring out the truth.").
However, it would seem that the use of "standing" as a device to prevent courts from usurping
the power of the other branches of government is based upon a misconception. "Standing" is but
one aspect of "justiciability." The latter term describes all the elements which make a matter fit
for judicial determination; other aspects of "justiciability" (particularly the "political question"
doctrine) adequately safeguard separation of powers. See notes 53, 71 infra, and accompanying text.
6 Associated Indus. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 700 (2d Cir.
1943).
'Translated, the term means "the law does not concern itself with trifles." See, e.g., Porter
v. Rushing, 65 F. Supp. 759 (W.D. Ark. 1946); Loefller v. Roe, 69 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 1953);
Sonnier v. United States Cas. Co., 245 La. 582, 157 So. 2d 911 (Cir. Ct. App. 1963).
SBarrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953); Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
Contra, NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), where the NAACP was permitted to assert
the constitutional rights of its members because such rights could be preserved only if they were
litigated by a representative.
9E.g., Bode v. Barrett, 344 U.S. 583 (1953); American Power & Light Co. v. Securities &
Exchange Comm'n, 329 U.S. 90 (1946); Houston Oil Co. v. Lawson, 175 S.W.2d 716 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1943), error ref.
1°Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923): "[Plaintiff must allege] some direct injury . . . not merely that he suffers . . . in common with people generally."; B. SCHWARTZ, THE
SUPREME COURT 144-45 (1957): "Unless [the plaintiff] is adversely affected personally, as an individual, he is seeking only a judgment in the abstract upon the constitutionality of such an act.
Such a proceeding . . . is not enough to call for the exercise of a court of its judicial power."
" If tax payments are "earmarked" for a particular appropriation, however, persons who pay
the tax have standing to contest the appropriation. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
Butler involved the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, ch. 25, 48 Stat. 31, which attempted
to support farm prices with a tax on processors of farm products. The Act called for the processors' tax payments to be channeled into a special treasury fund from which they were to be distributed to farmers who agreed to plant crops according to government instructions.
Moreover, even if the plaintiff is affected in a special way by an appropriation, as he would be
if the money were given directly to him, he still could not contest the appropriation, because one
has no standing to question legislation which behefits him. E.g., In re Pittsburgh Rys., 113 F.
Supp. 233 (W.D. Pa. 1953); Kent Club v. Toronto, 6 Utah 2d 67, 305 P.2d 870 (1957).
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as de minimis. Thus, a logical application of the traditional rules of standing would appear to preclude effectively a suit to contest government appropriations.
II.

STANDING

To

CHALLENGE STATE AND MUNICIPAL
EXPENDITURES

Despite traditional standing concepts, courts have devised a means to
permit municipal and state appropriations to be tested judicially. The device through which such expenditures -may be challenged is the taxpayer's
suit."3 In such suits, the courts distinguish taxpayers from "people generally," and thus overcome the traditional standing requirement that the plaintiff's injury or interest be "personal." However, the line which the courts
seek to draw between the taxpayer and "people generally" is unconvincing,
and it seems that a taxpayer's suit is nothing more than an artifice by
which government appropriations may be challenged."
The courts' attempts to fit the taxpayer into the role of a conventional
plaintiff (i.e., one who is "personally" and "substantially" injured) may
be divided into two categories, although the courts themselves do not always recognize such a distinction in their reasoning."5 Category one may
be denominated the "financial interest" theory. According to this view,
first used in suits against municipalities"6 but now also employed at the
state level,"' taxpayers' contributions to the local treasury give them a
"tpersonal" interest in municipal appropriations. Thus, a municipal or state
taxpayer's suit is viewed as roughly analogous to a private stockholder's
derivative suit against his corporation. The second rationale upon which
the courts have predicated taxpayers' standing is the "financial injury"
theory."8 Courts following this theory reason that government misspending
of tax money is wasteful and personally injures taxpayers by increasing
their future tax payments.
At first blush, either theory of taxpayers' standing seems adequate, for
under both, the "personal" and "substantial" facets of traditional standing
precepts ostensibly are observed. However, neither rationale withstands
" However, a large corporation's stake in a specific federal appropriation may be several million
dollars, an amount which cannot be considered de minimis by any standard. See note 42 infra.
13 State taxpayers' suits are at present apparently available in every state but New York. See St.
Clair v. Yonkers Raceway, 13 N.Y.2d 72, 192 N.E.2d 15 (1963). Municipal taxpayers' suits appear to be available in every state but Kansas. See Asendorf v. Common School Dist. No. 102, 175
Kan. 601, 266 P.2d 309 (1954). See generally 3 K. DAvss, ADMINISTRATIvE LAW TREATISE §
22.09 (1958), §§ 22.09-.10 (Supp. 1965); Jaffe, Standing To Secure Judicial Review: Public Actions, 74 HARV. L. Ruv. 1265 (1961); Comment, Taxpayers' Suits: A Survey and Summary; 69
YALE L.J. 895 (1960).
14 See notes 19-24 infra, and accompanying text.
'E.g., Ethington v. Wright, 66 Ariz. 382, 189 P.2d 209 (1948), where the court apparently
applied both theories in a single case.
6
" E.g., Sherlock v. Village of Winnetka, 59 I11. 389 (1871); Shipley v. Smith, 45 N.M. 23,
107 P.2d 1050 (1940). See generally Comment, Municipal Taxpayers and Standing To Sue, 2 BUFFALO L. REV. 140 (1952).
"7E.g., Ethington v. Wright, 66 Ariz. 382, 189 P.2d 209 (1948).
8
1 Coyle v. Housing Authority, 151 Conn. 421, 198 A.2d 709 (1964); McKaig v. Mayor of
Cumberland, 208 Md. 95, 116 A.2d 384 (1955); Azbill v. Lexington Mfg. Co., 188 Tenn. 477,
221 S.W.2d 522 (1949); Wright v. Nashville Gas & Heating Co., 183 Tenn. 477, 194 S.W.2d
459 (1946).
"
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analysis. The "financial interest" theory, which apparently was imported
from England," rests upon the dubious premise that taxpayers have an interest in appropriations which is different from that of other persons. This
assumption is surely fallacious, because tax moneys are collected and disbursed to benefit the general public,"0 not merely those persons who pay
taxes. Thus, a taxpayer has no personal interest (i.e., one different from
that of any other person) which he can urge upon the court as a ground
for standing to contest appropriations.
Taxpayers' standing under the "financial injury" theory is equally
questionable when measured by traditional standards. The assumption of a
financial injury due to future tax increases satisfies the traditional standing
requirement that the plaintiff suffer a personal injury; however, his standing is still open to attack on the ground that it fails to meet the substantial injury requirement of traditional standing. The financial injury, if any,
suffered by an individual taxpayer as a result of wrongful government appropriations is almost always so speculative and so small that it surely fits
the de minimis category.' In some states, the courts have attempted to meet
this problem by limiting taxpayers' suits to instances in which a substantial
appropriation is involved." Other states have enacted statutes which require a specified number of taxpayers to join together to bring suit." By
contrast, the courts in several states have ignored the de minimis problem
and have allowed taxpayers to contest government action even where there
is virtually no expenditure of funds. 4
" The Municipal Corporations Act, 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 76, as amended, 45 & 46 Vict., c. 50
(1882), required municipal officers to treat municipal funds as a public trust.
"oSuch an assumption at the municipal and state levels rests upon the fact that use of public
improvements, made with tax money, is not restricted to those who contributed taxes. At the
federal level, the assumption is buttressed by the General Welfare clause, although it has never
been specifically interpreted to allow Congress to tax and spend "for the general welfare." With
regard to a taxpayer's interest in tax moneys, Justice Harlan has noted:
The simple fact is that no such rights can sensibly be said to exist. Taxes are
ordinarily levied by the United States without limitations of purpose; absent such
a limitation payments received by the Treasury in satisfaction of tax obligations
lawfully created become part of the Government's general funds. The national
legislature is required by the Constitution to exercise its spending powers 'to provide
for the common Defense and general Welfare.' Art. I, § 8, cl. 1. Whatever other
implications there may be to that sweeping phrase, it surely means that the United
States holds its general funds, not as stakeholder or trustee for those who have
paid its imposts, but as surrogate for the population at large.
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 118 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
" In this regard, it is important to distinguish between the "financial injury" theory and the
"financial interest" theory. If the former is applied, the argument that a large corporation should
have standing because it has a million dollar "interest" in a particular expenditure is of no moment. The only issue is whether the corporation's future taxes will be increased by the appropriation. See note 42 infra. Conversely, if the "financial interest" theory is employed, it seems that
the taxpayer should not be denied standing because his injury is "de minimis." The size of the
taxpayer's "interest" should be irrelevant. However, in Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447
(1923), the Court apparently adopted the "financial interest" theory of taxpayers' suits yet refused to grant a federal taxpayer standing because his "interest" in federal appropriations was not
large enough. See notes 28-33, 42 infra, and accompanying text.
2"E.g., Bassett v. Desmond, 140 Conn. 426, 101 A.2d 294 (1953); Ryan v. City of Chicago,
369 I1. 59, 15 N.E.2d 708 (1938); Azbitl v. Lexington Mfg. Co., 188 Tenn. 477, 221 S.W.2d 522
(1949); Goodland v. Zimmerman, 243 Wis. 459, 10 N.W.2d 180 (1943).
3MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 29, § 63 (1966) (twenty-four taxpayers to enjoin state appropriations); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 40, § 53 (1966) (ten taxpayers to enjoin municipal appropriations);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, S 2251 (1964) (ten taxpayers to enjoin municipal contract violating
conflict of interest statute).
4
' E.g., Clapp v. Town of Jaffrey, 97 N.H. 456, 91 A.2d 464 (1952); Vibberts v. Hart, 85
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CONTEST FEDERAL

APPROPRIATIONS-THE FROTHINGHAM RULE

In 1899 a federal taxpayer sued to enjoin the disbursement of federal
funds to a religious hospital,25 claiming that such action violated the establishment clause of the first amendment. The Supreme Court passed over
the question of the petitioner's standing to sue and ruled on the merits of
the case, thus inferring that federal taxpayers' standing was a reality.
However, in 1907 when a federal taxpayer sued to enjoin the construction
of the Panama Canal,"6 the Court apparently had second thoughts about
allowing federal taxpayers' suits. Again the Court heard the merits of the
case, but in reference to the contention that the taxpayer lacked standing
to sue, the Court stated: "We do not stop to consider these or other kindred objections; yet passing on them in silence must not be taken as even
an implied ruling against their sufficiency.""7 Thus, it was not clear if the
federal courts were willing to adopt the taxpayer's suit as a device to permit challenges to federal appropriations.
The fate of the federal taxpayer was finally resolved in 1923 in the famous case of Frothingham v. Mellon.28 Mrs. Frothingham questioned the
constitutionality of the Maternity Act of 1921,2 which provided for federal payments to the states to help combat childbirth mortality. Her contention was that the Maternity Act was an infringement upon the powers
reserved to the states by the Constitution, that any appropriation made
under the Act was therefore unconstitutional, and that the unconstitutional appropriations would increase her future tax burden, thereby taking
her property without due process of law. The Supreme Court held that the
plaintiff's position as a federal taxpayer did not, by itself, give her standing to contest the appropriations of the federal government.
In disposing of Frothingham, the Court used language involving both
the "substantial" and "personal" requirements of the traditional standing
doctrine. Distinguishing the case from the traditional taxpayer's suit
against a municipal government, the Court stated that the municipal taxpayer has a "direct and immediate"' interest in municipal expenditures,
the relationship being "not without some resemblance""1 to that existing
between stockholder and private corporation. On the other hand, the Court
observed, a federal taxpayer's interest "in the moneys of the Treasury...
is shared with millions of others; is comparatively minute and indeterminable; and the effect upon future taxation, of any payment out of the funds,
[is very] remote, fluctuating, and uncertain.""2 Thus, in denying the fedR.I. 35, 125 A.2d 193 (1956); Lein v. Northwestern Eng'r Co., 74 S.D. 476, 54 N.W.2d 472
(1952); Miller v. City of Pasco, 50 Wash. 2d 229, 310 P.2d 863 (1957).
25Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899).
2 Wilson v. Shaw, 204 U.S. 24 (1907). For another case in which the Supreme Court accepted
jurisdiction in a taxpayer suit, see Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906).
7
" Wilson v. Shaw, 204 U.S. 24, 25 (1907).
28262 U.S. 447 (1923).
9
Ch. 135, 42 Stat, 224 (1921).
s°Frothingham v, Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 486 (1923).
" Id. at 487,
32 ld.
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eral taxpayer standing to sue, the Court apparently adopted the "financial
interest" view of taxpayer suits," but concluded that although a municipal
taxpayer had a personal interest in municipal funds, a federal taxpayer had
no such interest in federal expenditures.
IV.

FEDERAL COURT REVIEW OF STATE AND MUNICIPAL
TAXPAYERS' SUITS

Despite the fact that the Supreme Court would not entertain a federal
taxpayer's action, the Court, subsequent to Frothingham,did review a state
taxpayer's suit challenging state appropriations. In Everson v. Board of Education,34 a state taxpayer claimed that a New Jersey statute authorizing
free transportation for parochial school children violated the establishment clause. Curiously enough, on appeal from state court, the Supreme
Court heard the case on the merits without considering the question of
the taxpayer-plaintiff's standing to sue.
Later however, in Doremus v. Board of Education,a the Court squarely
faced the issue of federal court review of state taxpayers' suits. In Doremus
a state taxpayer sued to enjoin Bible reading in public schools, claiming
that such readings constituted the establishment of religion. On appeal to
the Supreme Court, the petitioner relied upon Everson as the basis for his
standing to sue. However, the Court rejected this contention, noting that
a state taxpayer's action was available only to remedy unconstitutional
acts which result in "direct pecuniary injury. '"" Everson had been granted
standing because he showed "a measurable appropriation or disbursement
3' 7
of school-district funds occasioned solely by the activities complained of.
Since Doremus could show no "measurable" disbursement of funds caused
by the Bible reading, the Court concluded that he had no standing to sue.
In spite of the Court's seemingly plain language in Doremus, the guidelines for federal court review of state taxpayers' suits remain confused and
unclear. When applied to the facts of Doremus, the Court's emphasis on
the amount of government spending involved is particularly misleading.
Since the state of New Jersey was almost certainly spending a substantial
sum of tax money on its public schools, it seems that Doremus, by alleging that religion was being established in the public schools, demonstrated
the "measurable" disbursement of public funds required to give him standing to sue. However, the Doremus Court, in its search for disbursement of
33 See notes 16 and 17 supra, and accompanying text.
34330 U.S. 1 (1947).
3a342 U.S. 429 (1952). The Everson and Doremus cases have created a situation in which a
state court can make a constitutional determination which is unreviewable by the Supreme Court.
If a taxpayer suit is brought in a state court which has no requirement that the taxpayer-plaintiff
suffer pecuniary damage in order to have standing (see note 24 supra, and accompanying text),
the state court may proceed to the merits of the case. But such a suit cannot be appealed to the
Supreme Court unless the plaintiff meets the higher standing requirement of a "good-faith pocketbook injury" as set out in Doremus. One unique solution to the above problem would be to make
"standing to raise a federal constitutional question, itself a federal question, so that it will be
decided uniformly throughout the country." P. FREUND, SUPREME COURT AND SUPREME LAW
35 (Cohn ed. 1954).
SSDoremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429, 434 (1952).
37 Id.
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funds, apparently focused only upon the particular activity in question
(Bible reading) and considered the overall amount spent on the school
system irrelevant. Thus, Dorernus most likely stands for the proposition
that a state taxpayer has standing in federal court only if he demonstrates
that the particular state activity he is attacking has caused a "measurable"
disbursement of state tax money.
V.

THE EFFECT OF FROTHINGHAM AND DOREMuS

The Frothingham and Doremus decisions created profound confusion in
the law regarding taxpayers' standing in federal court. Much of this
confusion arose from the Supreme Court's changing view as to the nature
of a taxpayer's suit. In Frotbingham the Court seemingly subscribed to the
"financial interest" fiction"5 and distinguished municipal and federal taxpayers' suits (with no mention of state taxpayers' suits) on the ground that
the taxpayer's "interest" in federal tax moneys was too remote. However,
in Doremus the Court evidently shifted fictions,"' ruling that all taxpayers'
suits (municipal, state, and federal) would be reviewable by the Court if
they formed a "good-faith pocketbook action"' ° resulting from direct pecuniary "injury." But the Doremus Court was careful to reiterate that a
federal taxpayer could not show such an injury.
As discerned from Frothingham and Doremus, the law seemed to be that
federal courts could review some municipal and state taxpayers' suits, but
that they could never entertain a federal taxpayer's action. The ban on
federal taxpayers' suits created a special problem with regard to federal aid
to education programs providing for federal payments to religious as well
as to public schools. Although it was arguable that such payments violated
the first amendment prohibition regarding the establishment of religion, no
one had standing to litigate this issue."1 This fact, as well as the generally
inconsistent treatment of municipal or state and federal taxpayers' suits,
precipitated attacks by legal commentators,' 2 some of whom called for a
"s See notes 16 and 17 supra, and accompanying text,
s9See note 18 supra, and accompanying text.
4'Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429, 434 (1952).
41 A taxpayer, or "citizen," is the only possible plaintiff to contest federal aid to religious
schools. The situation must be distinguished from Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203
(1963), and similar cases in which plaintiffs attacked prayer and other alleged establishments in the
public schools. In those cases, the Court found that the plaintiff's children were injured personally
because the recitation of prayer and other alleged establishments indirectly coerced them to conform
to the religious beliefs of the majority. Conversely, aid to religious schools benefits the children
who attend and their parents, and one has no standing to contest legislation which benefits him.
See, e.g., In re Pittsburgh Rys., 113 F. Supp. 233 (W.D. Pa. 1953).
42 The Frotbingham Court's attempt to distinguish federal and municipal taxpayers' suits
on
the ground that a federal taxpayer's interest in federal funds is "minute" has come under heavy
attack. The writers' premise seems to be that although the basis of a municipal or state taxpayer's
suit (a "personal" interest of the taxpayer) is a fiction, the fiction is equally applicable to federal
taxpayers' actions. See generally, Comment, supra note 13, at 917 n.127; Davis, Standing To Challenge Governmental Action, 39 MINN. L. REV. 353, 387 (1965):
The Court's major idea that a municipal taxpayer has a larger and more direct
stake in a municipal expenditure than a federal taxpayer has in a federal expenditure
• . . is now contrary to the facts. General Motors in a recent year paid well over a
billion dollars in federal taxes. This means that General Motors has about a two
per cent stake in every federal expenditure. When the federal government undertakes
a program involving an expenditure of ten billion dollars, the General Motors portion
is about two hundred million dollars-hardly a minute sum in an absolute sense.
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reversal of the Frothingham rule." However, before such a result could be
obtained, a key question left untouched by Frothingham had to be answered favorably.
The jurisdiction of federal courts, unlike that of state courts, is limited
by article III of the Constitution to "cases" and "controversies."" Thus, at
times federal standing is denied because of the case or controversy limitation, while on other occasions a case or controversy may exist, yet standing
is denied because of court-made rules. Unfortunately, in Frothingham the
Court did not specifically address itself to the issue of whether Mrs. Frothingham was denied standing because a federal taxpayer's suit did not form
an article III case or controversy, or merely because she failed to meet the
court-made test of "standing to sue." If the basis of Frothingham was the
article III limitation on the jurisdiction of the federal courts, no federal
taxpayer's action could ever be maintained. On the other hand, if Frothingham was only a "court-made rule" decision, federal taxpayer standing
could exist, provided federal taxpayers were found to have a "personal"
interest in federal appropriations.
At first blush, the Frothingham opinion seems to support the view that
a federal taxpayer's suit does not constitute a case or controversy.' However, the Court's attempt to distinguish municipal and federal taxpayers'
suits and its statement that federal court review of a municipal taxpayer's
action "is not inappropriate"4 indicate that the Court considered the municipal taxpayer's suit within the purview of article III. Thus, the implication was that a federal taxpayer's suit could create a case or controversy if the taxpayer's interest in federal moneys were "personal." Later,
Everson and Doremus provided further support for this view. In order for
the Court to hear those cases it had to find that a state taxpayer's suit constituted an article III case or controversy. Moreover, in Doremus the Court
clearly enunciated this proposition.' The fact that both municipal and state
taxpayers' actions could, under the proper circumstances, create a case or
controversy augmented the conclusion that a federal taxpayer's suit could
form one also. Thus, it seemed likely that there was no constitutional barrier to a federal taxpayer's action; 8 however, the basis of the Frothingham
ban on federal taxpayers' suits remained an unresolved question for fortyfive years.
The answer to this argument is that General Motors' interest in tax moneys is no different from
that of any other "person." See notes 20, 21 supra, and accompanying text.
" See L. PFsFFERt, supra note 1; Davis, supra note 42.
" U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
' The Court stated: "To [decide this case] would not be to decide a judicial controversy, but
to assume a position of authority over the governmental acts of another and co-equal departmentan authority which we plainly do not possess." Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923).
461d. at 486.
4",,Itis true that this Court found a justiciable controversy in Everson v. Board of Education .... " Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429, 434 (1952).
48See, e.g., Arthur Garfield Hays Civil Liberties Conference: Public Aid to Parochial Schools
and Standing To Bring Suit, 12 BUFFALO L. REV. 35, 48-65 (1962); Davis, supra note 42, at
389-91; Jaffe, Standing To Secure judicial Review: Private Actions, 75 HARv. L. REv. 255, 302-03
(1961); Hearings on S. 2097 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 89th Cong., 2d Sess.465 (1966).
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VI. FLAST V. COHEN-A NEW TEST FOR FEDERAL
TAXPAYERS' STANDING

In Flast v. Cohen" the constitutionality of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, "' which authorizes federal payments to finance
guidance services and classroom instruction in religious as well as public
schools, was at issue. The petitioner, a federal taxpayer, argued that the
portions of the Act authorizing such payments violated the establishment
clause. However, a three-judge federal court, relying on Frothingham,held
that the plaintiff had no standing to sue and summarily dismissed her complaint."' Although that court admitted that Frothingham had often been
criticized, it nevertheless felt bound to apply the "no-standing" rule in
light of the fact that "the case [had] never been overruled or limited by
the Supreme Court.""
On appeal, however, the Supreme Court squarely faced the question that
had been so long debated by legal scholars: was the Frothingham ban on
federal taxpayers' suits based on the case or controversy limitation of article
III or was it merely a judicially created rule of standing? The government
contended that the former interpretation was compelled by the separation
of powers doctrine, but after a close look at the concepts of "standing" and
"justiciability," the Court firmly rejected this view:
The question whether a particular person is a proper party to maintain the
action does not, by its own force, raise separation of powers problems related
to improper judicial interference in areas committed to other branches of the
Federal government. Such problems arise, if at all, only from the substantive
issues the individual seeks to have adjudicated. Thus, in terms of Article III
limitations on federal court jurisdiction, the question of standing is related

only to whether the dispute sought to be adjudicated will be presented in an
adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of resolution.
It is for this reason that the emphasis in standing problems is on whether the
party invoking federal court jurisdiction has 'a personal stake in the outcome
of the controversy' . . . ."

Having found no constitutional bar to federal taxpayers' suits, the Court
struck down the Frothingham barrier insofar as it prevented challenges
to federal appropriations which allegedly violated the establishment clause.
Furthermore, the Court set out a "double nexus" test for determining
whether a federal taxpayer has the requisite "personal stake in the outcome
of the controversy"' to give him standing to contest a federal appropriation. First, the taxpayer must establish a logical nexus between his status
as a taxpayer and the type of legislation he is attacking. Thus, "a taxpayer
will be a proper party to allege the unconstitutionality only of exercises of
congressional power under the taxing and spending clause of Art. I, § 8 of
the Constitution. ' ' 3 Secondly, the taxpayer must demonstrate a nexus be49392

U.S. 83 (1968).

5020 U.S.C. §§ 241(a), 821-7 (Supp. 1!, 1965-66).
" Flast v. Gardner, 271 F. Supp. I (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
52 Id. at 4.

"Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 100-01 (1968).
54 I'd. at 101, quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
55Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102 (1968).
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tween his status as taxpayer and the type of constitutional infringement
he alleges. That is, he must demonstrate that "the challenged enactment
exceeds specific constitutional limitations imposed upon the exercise of the
congressional taxing and spending power and not simply that the enactment is generally beyond the powers delegated to Congress by Art. I, § 8. " 56
The Court then noted that in Flast the challenged appropriations were
made under the taxing and spending power of Congress so the first nexus
was established. It further concluded that the establishment clause historically constituted a "specific constitutional limitation" on Congress' taxing and spending power, so the second nexus was likewise present. Thus,
the taxpayer-plaintiff was a proper party to contest the appropriations
made under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965.
Although Flast was an eight-to-one decision, the Court was in fact united to this extent only on the question of whether the plaintiff had standing within the facts of the case. The Justices' views as to the desirability of
further exceptions to the Frothingharmrule differed greatly. The majority
apparently envisioned additional exceptions, because Chief Justice Warren, speaking for the Court, noted that "specific constitutional limitations"
on the congressional taxing and spending power other than the establishment clause could exist. Moreover, he concluded that taxpayers would be
proper parties to insure that such limitations, should they be found to exist,
are not breached by Congress. On the other hand, Justice Douglas felt that
the "double nexus" test would not be a durable one and that the Frothingham rule should be abolished in toto"
The remainder of the Court took a more restrictive view. In separate
concurring opinions Justices Stewart and Fortas, although agreeing with
the majority that Flast should be accorded standing to sue, hinted that they
would not favor a further watering down of Frothingham by finding other
specific constitutional limitations on congressional taxing and spending
power." And in a dissenting opinion Justice Harlan argued that even the
inroad made by Flast went too far. Although he agreed that federal taxpayers' suits are within the purview of article III so as to give the federal
courts jurisdiction over them, he felt that the policy "' behind the Frothingham rule was sound and that the Court should decline to hear such cases
unless specifically authorized to do so by Congress."0
6Id. at 102-03. (Emphasis added.)
7
" Id. at 107 (Douglas, J., concurring).
18,[i]
understand [the judgment and opinion of the Court] to hold only that a federal taxpayer has standing to assert that a specific expenditure of federal funds violates the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment." Id. at 114 (Stewart, J., concurring). "I would confine the
ruling in this case to the proposition that a taxpayer may maintain a suit to challenge the validity
of a federal expenditure on the ground that the expenditure violates the Establishment Clause."
Id. at 115 (Fortas, J., concurring).
59 See notes 72-79 infra, and accompanying text.
"oAn attempt was made to insert into the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, 20 U.S.C.
§§ 241(a), 821-7 (Supp. II, 1965-66), a provision which would make federal aid to religious
schools reviewable by the courts. See a discussion of these efforts in S. REP. No. 85, 90th Cong.,
Ist Sess. 2 (1967), and S. REt'. No. 473, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1967). However, the attempt
was defeated.
Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 501-59 (Supp. II, 1965-66), "persons
aggrieved" by the action of an administrative agency have standing to contest that action. Moreover, the Act has been interpreted to permit some "citizens' suits." Thus, in Scripps-Howard
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A. Some Implications of Flast v. Cohen
The Flast test for determining taxpayer standing to contest federal appropriations is an extremely vague and flexible one, apparently designed
to permit the Supreme Court to pick and choose from all federal appropriations those which it would like to review. A few very general guidelines
are, however, available for predicting the Court's future course.
Under the "double nexus" test, a taxpayer has standing to contest only
appropriations per se. The Court was careful to exclude from the ambit
of taxpayer standing "incidental expenditures of tax funds in the administration of an essentially regulatory statute."'" Thus, it appears that federal
taxpayers still have no standing to contest such alleged establishments as
prayer in the Armed Forces or in Congress because such activities do not
directly involve an appropriation. 2
A second premise which emerges with some clarity from Flast is that a
federal taxpayer has standing to attack appropriations made under the congressional taxing and spending power on the ground that they violate the
specific prohibition imposed by the establishment clause. However, it is
not clear whether other constitutional bases exist for challenging appropriations. Since the Court distinguished Flast from Frothingham, it is implied
the the due process clause of the fifth amendment, upon which Mrs.
Frothingham based her claim, does not constitute a "specific constitutional
limitation" on the taxing and spending power of Congress and, therefore,
is no basis upon which a federal taxpayer can attack a federal appropriation."
Any attempt to discern other "specific constitutional limitations" is
purely conjectural. The Court stated that it will look to the substantive issues of each case in order to determine whether a particular appropriation
is vulnerable to attack. Hence, the Court's opinion as to whether the appropriation is prohibited by a particular constitutional provision will ultimately determine whether a federal taxpayer has standing to sue.
One issue which is raised, and perhaps left unanswered, by Flast is the
extent to which that case will affect the Supreme Court's earlier decision
in Doremus v. Board of Education" with regard to state taxpayers' standing in federal court. Under the Doremus test, a state taxpayer will be
granted standing if he demonstrates a "direct pecuniary injury"" resulting
Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4 (1942) and FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 420
(1940), radio stations were held to have standing to sue as "a representative of the public interest." Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, supra, at 14.
05Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102 (1968).
62 However, it is possible that taxpayers now have standing to contest the maintenance of
congressional and military chaplains, since federal funds are appropriated to pay their salaries. But
perhaps this question is political.
.a The Court ostensibly did not treat the issue of whether the due process clause of the fifth
amendment is such a "specific constitutional limitation." Rather, it distinguished Frotbingsam on
the ground that "the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment does not protect taxpayers
against increases in tax liability, and the taxpayer in Frotbingham failed to make any additional

claim that the harm she alleged resulted from a breach by Congress of the specific constitutional
limitations imposed upon the exercise of the taxing and spending power." Flast v. Cohen, 392
U.S. 83, 105 (1968).
64342 U.S. 429 (192).
6
5 Id. at 434.
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from a measurable disbursement of state funds. There is no requirement
that the disbursement of funds be made under the taxing and spending
power of the state, and it is unnecessary that the state taxpayer show that
the disbursement violates some "specific constitutional limitation" on the
state taxing and spending power. Conversely, a federal taxpayer must es-

tablish both of these facts in order to gain standing under the Flast test.
Does the Flast decision mean that the Court intends to impose the stricter
Flaststandards on state taxpayers' suits in federal court? In Flast, the Court
made no mention of state or municipal taxpayers' suits, except to note
that the holding that federal taxpayers could contest only appropriations
per se was "consistent " " with the Doremus limitations on state taxpayers'
standing in federal court. This language implies that the Court may have
rewritten the Doreinus test, and perhaps in the future, state taxpayers'

standing in federal court will be limited to attacks on appropriations per
se. However, it seems unlikely that state taxpayers will have to meet the
more difficult test of demonstrating that the state appropriation violates

some "specific constitutional limitation" on the spending power of the
state.

One final question merits attention. Are congressional actions other
than spending now open to taxpayer attack? One which may be is the taxexempt status of religion. The Flast Court stated that taxpayers can contest
congressional "action" under the taxing and spending clause; thus it ap-

pears likely that taxpayers will have standing to challenge the constitutionality of the exemption of religious organizations from federal taxes.
B. A Brief Critique and Some Theoretical
Considerationsof Flast v. Cohen
The Flast standard for federal taxpayers' standing to challenge federal
appropriations is, as Justice Harlan observed in his dissent,"7 wholly illogical. This is primarily because the test is predicated upon the fiction that a
taxpayer is "personally" injured by an unconstitutional federal expenditure." Since tax money is generally collected and expended for the benefit
of all persons, without special regard for those who pay taxes, the taxpayer's interest in federal appropriations is no different from that of anyone else subject to the dominion of the United States. In reality then,
Flast's claim was not that she was injured as a "taxpayer" due to unconstitutional appropriations, but that she was injured by the establishment of
religion."
However, even assuming arguendo that a federal taxpayer suffers a
**personal" injury when the federal government spends tax money uncon"6Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102 (1968).
67 Id. at 116 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
6
8See note 20 supra, and accompanying text.
6" The Flast Court, however, did not adopt the theory that the establishment clause creates a
personal constitutional right held by all citizens so that any citizen has standing to contest any
establishment of religion. The argument is persuasive. Establishment, by its very nature, may
affect no one "personally" in the traditional sense; yet the establishment clause sets out one of the
basic concepts of our social structure-separation of church and state. Perhaps the Court did not
go this far because it was unnecessary. Conventional plaintiffs are available to test most alleged
establishments.
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stitutionally, there is still no logical basis for the Flast requirements for
taxpayer standing. Under the "double nexus" test, taxpayers have standing to contest only those appropriations which arise under the taxing and
spending power of Congress as opposed to those which are incident to some
other power. Implicit in this distinction is the assumption that the character of the taxpayer's injury varies according to the enumerated power
which Congress happens to exercise in spending tax money. Such a distinction is indefensible. All that really matters to the taxpayer is that the
money was spent unconstitutionally, and that the injury to the taxpayer
from such spending either is or is not "personal."
The second aspect of the "double nexus" test may be similarly criticized.
The nature of the taxpayer's injury is not determined by the constitutional
provision which the federal spending violates. Thus, there is no basis for
the Flast Court's ruling that a federal taxpayer is injured "personally"
by a federal appropriation which transgresses the establishment clause of
the first amendment but that he is not so injured by an appropriation
which is violative of the due process clause of the fifth amendment.
Because the Flast standard is illogical, one may wonder why the Supreme
Court adopted it. The answer probably lies in the vague tenets of "public
policy." In Flast the Court apparently concluded that some federal appropriations should be subject to judicial review. To permit such review, the
Court in effect 7created, although they certainly would never admit it, a
"public action." The theory of the "public action" is predicated upon
the belief that a personally injured or affected plaintiff is not always necessary to a justiciable controversy. According to the "public action" rationale, which has always been rejected by the Supreme Court, a high degree
of public interest in a particular matter may sometimes take the place of
a personally injured plaintiff, creating the degree of adversity needed to
make a matter fit for judicial determination, provided the other aspects of
"justiciability" are present."1 Thus, the Flast test can be explained as the
Supreme Court's attempt to create a standing requirement which would
permit a suit believed by the Court to be necessary at the present time,
but which would prevent a generally available "public action" in which
any citizen or taxpayer could contest virtually every action of the federal
government.
The merits of a federal "public action" have been often debated, and
two practical reasons for refusing to permit such suits were voiced in
" The term "public action" was created by Professor Jaffe. See Jaffe, supra note 13, at 1267:
The problem of standing is twofold. Let us denominate the two types of suit
broadly as 'public' and 'private,' although the line betweeen the two cannot be conceived absolutely. The plaintiff asserting a 'public' right may be affected no differently from any other person. This would be the broadest possible category of potential plaintiffs. A shade narrower is the category of 'citizen;' and the category of
'taxpayer' will include some who are and some who are not 'citizens.' Yet an action
by any of these can properly be thought of and evaluated as a public action.
71 Professor Jaffe defines
the criteria of justiciability as: "the intensity of the plaintiff's claim
to justice (standing); the degree and legitimacy of the public's claim to a solution (public interest) ; the clarity with which the issues have emerged so as to be seen in all their bearings (ripeness) ;
the possibility of deriving a governing rule from authoritative norms and of forming an enforceable
decree (political question)." Jaffe, Standing To Secure Judicial Review: Private Actions, 75 HaRv.
L. Rev. 255, 304 (1961).
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Frothingham v. Mellon."2 There the Court noted that "[i]f one taxpayer
may champion and litigate such a cause, then every other taxpayer may do
the same ....
The bare suggestion of such a result, with its attendant inconveniences, goes far to sustain the result which we have reached, that a
suit of this character cannot be maintained."7 This language gives expression to two distinct fears: (1) the overcrowding of the courts, and (2)
delay in the administration of the federal government.
The argument that federal "public actions" will overcrowd the courts is
unimpressive. The excuse of crowded courtrooms is poor reason for denying the vindication of constitutional rights. Moreover, whether recognition of a federal "public action" would overburden the courts at all is debatable.' What evidence there is suggests that it would not, 5 and modern
joinder and class action provisions further weaken the argument.
The contention that "public actions" at the federal level would delay
the administration of the federal government is likewise not supported by
analysis. Proponents of the Frothingham view argue that the very federal
programs likely to be hit hardest by federal "public actions" would be
those in which expediency is essential: foreign affairs and national defense."7 However, these areas surely are "political" in nature and therefore
not justiciable. Thus there is no need to resort to the "standing" doctrine
to keep suits over foreign affairs and national defense out of court. On the
other hand, some delay in administration likely would be encountered in
areas which cannot be disposed of by the "political question" doctrine. Yet
a small amount of delay has not seriously affected state or municipal government administration, and it is probable that such delay would not inconvenience the federal government to any great extent.

Although the arguments favoring the Frothingham rule are not persuasive, enthusiasm for a generally available federal "public action" should be
tempered by two considerations. First, the "public action" is needed less at

the federal level of government than at the local level." The function of
a generally available "public action" is to control the actions of the government; hence such a suit is most desirable when other political control
over governmental misconduct (i.e., the electorate) is weak and ineffective.

Since electoral control, because of its great dependence upon publicity,
works more effectively at the national level of government than at the local

level, 9 the need for the added control afforded by the "public action" is
72262 U.S. 447 (1923).
71 Id. at 487.
74

See Davis, supra note 42, at 665:
Arguments that the courts would be flooded with taxpayer suits if taxpayers could
challenge expenditures are based on a misunderstanding. The Court could, and would
in early cases, establish the constitutionality of basic spending programs, putting to
rest through enunciation of principles more than nine-tenths of potential problems.
The judicial doors would then be open for the special problems, such as the validity
of federal aid to parochial schools. The long-term effect on the volume of litigation
would be slight.

7 The only evidence of any consequence is that no state which allows taxpayer actions has retreated
from this position.
8
" This fact was specifically noted by the Court in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94 (1968).
See Comment, supra note 13; Jaffe, supra note 13.
Jaffe, supra note 13, at 1283-84.
79Id.
7

7
1See
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much less.
The second consideration which dictates against a generally available
federal "public action" is that the practical principle underlying the traditional standing doctrine is still a viable one. The requirement of a "personally" injured or affected plaintiff insures that lawsuits will be adversary
in nature so that the issues will be most clearly before the court." Consequently, the view adopted by the Flast Court-that a few pressing "public
rights" may be litigated but that a generally available "public action" will
not be permitted-appears to be the better approach. With this fact in
mind, the Court's formulation of an illogical, flexible standing requirement was proper. In this way, the Court will be able to make an independent determination of the justiciability of each new case as it arises.
VII. CONCLUSION

In Flast, the Court probably was persuaded to allow the suit partly out
of sympathy for what seemed to be a "right without a remedy." The
Court had implied previously that the establishment clause could be violated without affecting anyone personally,8' and the Flast majority apparently found the potential for such a situation in federal appropriations to
religious schools. Thus the Court manipulated the flexible concept of
"standing to sue" in order to permit such appropriations to be tested in
court.
However, it should be noted that Flast does not bind the Supreme Court
to review the constitutionality of federal aid to education or any other
federal appropriation. As the Court observed, a ruling that the plaintiff has
"standing to sue" does not require a subsequent determination that a particular matter is "justiciable."'" Hence, the Court could still refuse to entertain taxpayer challenges to federal appropriations, including payments
to religious schools, on the ground that they constitute a "political question" committed to Congress for determination. Nevertheless, the Court's
failure to dismiss Flast strongly suggests that the Court does not consider
congressional appropriations to religious schools political in character, although it may well determine that some other spending programs (i.e.,
foreign aid and national defense) do create political questions.
Perhaps it is well that the issues of religious tax exemption and federal
aid to education may soon be before the courts. Both of these practices are
thought to constitute establishment of religion by a respectable number of
people. Such heatedly contested issues should not be relegated to the ruminative writings of legal theoreticians; rather, they deserve the final adjudication which results from a court decision.

80 See note 4 supra.

81 In Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), the Court stated that the establishment clause
"does not depend upon any showing of direct governmental compulsion and is violated by the
enactment of laws which establish an official religion whether those laws operate directly to coerce
nonobserving individuals or not." Id. at 430 (emphasis added).
82 See note 53 supra, and accompanying text.

